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1. Introduction
Philosophers of science have been speculating on the way
scientific theories change, but it is quite recently that they start to
found their speculations on concrete historical researches on
actual changes in science. Hull's (1988a and 1988b) and Darden's
(1991) theories on conceptual changes are two of such recent
attempts (Hull uses taxonomy in biology, and Darden uses
Mendelism). In this paper I would like to examine their arguments
by applying them to another case in biology. The example I use is
the concept of "fitness." This concept has been a central concept in
evolutionary biology, but at the same time it has been confusing
one, and we can find many different usages (Dawkins, 1982
distinguished five major usages and added more. 179-194). The
history may partly support Hull's account of conceptual change
(Hull 1988a and 1988b), but this cannot be the whole story. We will
recognize that some theoretical requirements drove the changes,
and need to admit something like Darden's view on conceptual
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change (Darden 1991). In the course of the tracing of the history,
we will also see how philosophical conceptual analyses help the
understanding of the history.
In section 2, I summarize Hull's and Darden's VIews on
conceptual change. In section 3 through section 6, I go through
case studies from the history of the concept. Section 3 deals with
Spencer's original introduction of "fitness" and Darwin's adoption
of it. Section 4 deals with Social Darwinism and its use of "fitness"
as a normative word. In section 5, I discuss biologists' attempt to
measure "fitness" and the problem this attempt caused, namely
the tautology problem. Section 6 deals with Hamilton's "inclusive
fitness" and its influence. Finally in the last section, I shall
summarize the history and factors that have acted on the history.
The tables at the end of the paper review and compare different
notions of "fitness" dealt with in the paper.
2. Philosophical views on conceptual change
-- Hull and Darden
2.1 Hull's evolutionary view of conceptual change
David Hull put forward an explanation of conceptual change
in terms of social factors in a scientists' community (Hull 1988a
and 1988b). His explanation uses an analogy to the evolution of
species. For this purpose, he abstracts essential parts of
evolutionary theories. First, he distinguishes repJicators and
interactors. A replicator passes on its structure largely intact to
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succeSSIve generations. An interactor interacts with its
environment and this interaction causes differential replication of
replicators. Selection is a process in which the difference in
success of interactors causes differences in replication. As a result
of selection, some replicators pass on their structure through time
with or without small changes; this temporal succession is called a
lineage (Hull 1988b, 134-135).
Hull applies these notions to science itself (Hull 1988a, 434).
Replicators in science are beliefs, goals, methodologies, and so on.
Interactors are scientists. Scientists act for their conceptual
inclusive fitness, namely, so as to encourage other scientists to use
their work. For example, scientists give credit to other scientists in
their own work because this increases the credibility of the work.
This will in turn increase the possibility that the work is cited by
other scientists (Hull 1988a, 310). Another example is the
relationship between a scientist and his/her own graduate
students (Hull 1988b, 127-128). On the one hand, the scientists are
not required to give credit to the graduate students. On the other
hand, graduate students are "likely to be the chief conduits for
one's work to later generations" (Hull 1988b, 128). The scientist
should balance these· two considerations to maximize his/her own
conceptual inclusive fitness.
This account of conceptual change lacks an important element
in an evolutionary theory, that is, Hull does not explain how new
variations come in (Cain and Darden 1988, 165). Scientists come
up with new concepts or modification of an old concept, and
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without these new variations, science cannot evolve. When and
why do they introduce new variations? lHull's view on the
mechanism of selection in scientific activities is also unclear. Thus
far in the literature critiquing Hull's view, I have found no mention
on this point, but a selection takes place in a scientist's mind,
when helshe decides which paper to cite. Hull's account is
incomplete if he cannot account for their criteria for the selection.
Perhaps Hull's answer is that we need to do psychological
investigation to know exactly what occurs.
2.2 Darden's view on conceptual change
Hull's account takes into account social factors In
conceptual changes, but many philosophers point out that there
are also theoretical considerations for conceptual changes. Here
we consider Lindley Darden's view on conceptual change (Darden
1991, 168-190). She distinguishes empirical problems and
conceptual problems. Empirical problems come from anomalies in
evidence. Conceptual problems are not about empirical anomalies,
but are "about the adequacy of symbolic representations, the
introduction of new theoretical terms, and disputes about the need
for and properties ascribed to a new theoretical entities" (170). In
the course of examining the conceptual change in "gene" in
Mendelian genetics, she distinguishes these problems and their
1 Actually my point is a little different from Cain and Darden's. Their argument is
that variations are essential for selection. I agree with this. But my point is that
new variations are essential for evolution.
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solutions. To understand their solutions, she introduces
hypothetical "strategies" scientists might have used _. finding the
referent of the symbols, changing old components slightly, using
analogy, introducing new terminology, postulating an underlying
causal factor, and so on (188-190; as for the hypothetical character
of the strategies, see also 15-17). She also locates conceptual
change by making lists of general properties of several notions
(allelomorph, chromosome, factor, gene)(185-186). I will make
similar tables for historical changes of fitness at the end of this
paper.
Darden's analysis shows that scientists have internal (non
social) reasons for conceptual change, and gives good insights into
how new concepts are introduced. In this sense, Darden's view
complements Hull's view. On the other hand, recognition of
conceptual problems and the choice of a strategy may be
influenced by social factors as Hull describes. Moreover, scientists
might have "social" problems and strategies to solve them along
with empirical and conceptual ones. Sometimes such social
strategies may give us more plausible hypotheses about the
methods scientists used. In such cases, Darden's account may need
to be supplemented by Hull's view.
In the next several sections, we will examine the changes in
the concept of "fitness." These examples show that both social and
internal factors act to produce the change.
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3. "Survival of the fittest" and its adoption
3.1 Spencer's "survival of the fittest"
The first usage of the word "fitness" as a theoretical term in
evolutionary theory is credited to Herbert Spencer (1864). Herbert
Spencer introduced the phrase "survival of the fittest" as an
interchangeable phrase to Darwin's "natural selection, or the
preservation of favoured races in the struggle for life" (Spencer
1864, 444-445. Spencer's quotation from Darwin is from the latter
part of the title of the Origin of Species). To see what Spencer
meant by this phrase, let us see his discussion of it. Individuals in
a species are "necessarily made unlike, in countless ways and
degrees" (Spencer 1864, 444). With these variations, when the
environment has changed, "some will be less liable than others to
have their equilibria overthrown by a particular incident force,
previously unexperienced" (444). That is to say, "those will survive
whose functions happen to be most nearly in equilibrium with the
modified aggregate of external forces" (444). This is survival of the
fittest. Except for his peculiar word "equilibrium," this account is
almost the same as the account of natural selection by Darwin
(Darwin 1859, 80-81). There are several important points here in
comparison with later usages of "fitness." First, here is no direct
definition of "fitness." It is defined indirectly by defining the
"survival of the fittest" as synonymous to "natural selection."
Second, this "fitness" is relative to the environment, and
individuals "happen to be" the fittest, relative to the new
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environment. This point is important when compared with the
usage by Social Darwinists. Finally, here is no explicit mention of
reproductive success, though this will be a central part of the
meaning of "fitness."
3.2 Darwin's original usage of "fitness" in the first
edition of the Origin
Actually Darwin himself used the word "fitness" and "fitted"
several times in the first edition of the Origin of Species
(Darwin 1859, 88, 91, 472, 480; see also Paul 1994, 112). Once he
used the phrase "the continuous preservation of the individuals
best fitted" in almost the same sense as Spencer's "survival of the
fittest" (Darwin 1859, 91). But this was not a central theoretical
term (in his general statement of natural selection, Darwin did not
use the word; Darwin 1859, 80-81), and there was an important
difference between his usage and Spencer's one. First, take a look
at these two examples:
Nor ought we to marvel if all the contrivances in nature be not, as far as
we can judge, absolutely perfect; and if some of them be abhorrent to our
ideas of fitness. (Darwin 1859, 472)
...we may believe, that the teeth in the mature animal were reduced,
during successive generations, by disuse or by the tongue and palate
having been fitted by natural selection to browse without their aid...
(Darwin 1859,480)
As is obvious from the second quotation, Darwin's "fitness"
is caused by natural selection. In this sense, as Paul suggests
(Paul 1994, 112), Darwin's "fitted" and "fitness" are
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interchangeable with "adapted" and "adaptation." What is the
difference between "adaptation" and "fitness"? According to
Burian, "adaptation" has two primary meanings in evolutionary
context: one is "transgenerational alterations of the features and
capacities of organisms" that enable the organisms to solve their
problems (Burian 1994, 7); the other is "a trait or capacity" as the
product of this process (Burian 1994, 7). So the major difference
between two concepts is that "adaptation" implicitly mentions the
history of alteration which make the feature adapted, while
"fitness" has no such implication. Now, the above quotations from
Darwin show that his "fitness" refers to the history of alteration.
The first quotation is talking about the reason why we find
imperfect adaptations. If Darwin was using the word "fitness" in
the same sense as Spencer, this comment does not make sense. For
we have no reason to assume the organism which happens to be
the fittest one is also the perfect one for the environment, thus an
imperfect adaptation is not "abhorrent to our ideas of fitness" in
this sense. If we take the "fitness" in the sense of historical
alteration, on the other hand, it does make sense to ask why such
an alteration does not make a perfect adaptation. The second
quotation is about why the calf has teeth which they never use.
Darwin's explanation mentions the transgenerational alterations
in the way they browse. Thus this "fitted" is also replaceable with
"adapted" in Burian's sense. Given these considerations, we can
conclude that Darwin's original "fitness" is clearly different from
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Spencer's usage in the "survival of the fittest."2 This may be a
trivial point because anyway "fitness" was not an important
theoretical term for Darwin, but the point of this section is to
establish the priority of Spencer in introducing a new concept. I
think this argument is enough for this·purpose.
3.3 Darwin's adoption of "fitness"
It was A. R. Wallace who recommended to Darwin that he
adopt the new phrase "survival of fittest" (Wallace 1866, 140-141).
According to Wallace, the "survival of the fittest" is "the plain
expression of the fact," and "natural selection" is "a metaphorical
expression of it" and is "to a certain degree indirect and incorrect'
(141, emphases original). Wallace also cited two examples in which
critics had misunderstood the word "selection" and had claimed
that natural selection requires a chooser (141). Darwin accepted
Wallace's proposal (Darwin 1866, 144). He adopted the phrase the
"survival of the fittest" in the fifth edition of the Origin (Paul 1994,
112). As we can see in the sixth edition of the Origin, he changed
the title of the chapter 4 from "natural selection" to "natural
selection; or the survival of the fittest" (Darwin 1872, 97). He
explained the reason saying that the "Survival of the Fittest is
more accurate,· and is sometimes equally convenient" (Darwin
2 Actually Spencer himself used the word "fitness" in a confusing way; "[t]o him
[Darwin] we owe the discovery that natural selection is capable of producing
fitness between organisms and their circumstances..." (Spencer 1864, p.446,
emphasis original). This "fitness" seems to mean something like "harmony."
Moreover, as you see in the next section, his usage of "fitness" in his political
writings is quite different from these usages.
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1872, 77).3 He also added a comment on the misunderstanding
which Wallace pointed out (Darwin 1872, 99).
As Wallace's letter and the changes in the Origin suggest, the
reason for adopting the phrase "survival of the fittest" was two-
fold. One is a theoretical reason. By eliminating the metaphorical
word "selection," Wallace thought that Darwinism became a more
accurate description of the fact of the matter. In this point of view,
Darwin's "preservation of the most fitted" or "the preservation of
favoured races" was not enough, because these phrases still
personify the work of natural selection. But this theoretical
consideration is driven by the other reason, a social reason.
According to Bowler, the basic idea of evolution was soon accepted
by other biologists, while the idea of natural selection as a
mechanism for evolution met much resistance (Bowler 1989, 188).
So the task of Darwin and Wallace was not only to develop the
theory, but also to make the theory accepted by other scientists.
From this point of view, if the word "natural selection" can be a
stumbling block to understanding the theory, this is a sufficient
strategic reason to adopt an alternative expression. And as
Wallace pointed out, "selection" did cause a misunderstanding.
This misunderstanding might come from the intellectual
background of the age. The orthodox theory in the West in the
nineteenth century was creationism, that is, the theory that all
- 76-
species are (separately) created by God purposively. With this
teleological paradigm, people could easily read the word "selection"
with teleological connotation. On the other hand, the "survival of
the fittest" does not allow such a teleological reading. To
understand Wallace and Darwin's attitude, we need to take
account of this background.
Then, what was the result of adopting the phrase? When
Darwin accepted Wallace's criticism, he doubted that there would
be any effect of replacing natural selection with "survival of the
fittest." "The term Natural Selection has now been so largely used
abroad and at home that I doubt whether it could be given up, and
with all its faults I should be sorry to see the attempt made.
Whether it will be rejected must now depend 'on the survival of the
fittest'" (Darwin 1866, 144). The history proved that both of the
terms are good replicators in Hull's sense. We now still use both.
But the "survival of the fittest" and "fitness" seems to be a even
better replicator. Mills and Beatty points out that fitness "still
plays a major role in explanations of evolutionary phenomena"
(Mills and Beatty 1979, 267). My conjecture about the reason for
this popularity of "fitness" is that the notion promises us a kind of
convenience in thinking. When we see things from a "natural
selection" point of view, we should think in macroscopic level,
namely the environment and the organisms in it as a whole. We
a Darwin thought that "the survival of the fittest" is sometimes not equally
convenient as "natural selection" because "it ['the survival of the fittest'] cannot be
used as a substantive governing a verb" (Darwin 1866, 144). This consideration
may suggest another interesting motive for conceptual ehange.
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need imagination to think in this way. On the other hand, if we see
things from a "fitness" point of view, we can start from an
organism and its characteristics and then proceed to think about
interactions with the environment. This approach may lead us to
the biases of reductionistic research Wimsatt has pointed out
(Wimsatt 1980, 232-233), but it also make it easy for biologists to
imagine the situations and to find the solutions for their problems.
This advantage in the economy of thinking will be reflected in the
creativity of the biologists who use the "fitness" way of thinking,
and will increase their conceptual inclusive fitness (if the
advantages outweigh the disadvantages from reductionistic
biases). If this conjecture is right, this explains why people keep
using the concept of fitness.
4. Fitness and Social Darwinism
4.1 Three versions of Social Darwinism
Besides the theoretical meaning in biology, the phrase
"survival of the fittest" acquired social and political meanings
(Paul 1994, 113). This application of Darwinism to society is
usually called "Social Darwinism," but this is not a single political
movement (Jones 1980, Clark 1984). Darwinism was used
sometimes to defend laissez-faire capitalism, sometimes liberal
reformationism, sometimes eugenics. We shall concentrate on the
role of the notion "fitness" played in these applications.
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The first example of Social Darwinism is a justification of
laissez·faire capitalism. The most famous defender of this position
is Herbert Spencer himself. In a paper titled "The sins of
legislators," Spencer connects biology and his political claim as
follows:
[s]trange to say, now that this truth [evolution by natural selection] is
recognized by most cultivated people .. now that the beneficent work~llg
of the survival of the fittest has been so impressed on them that, much
more than people in past times, they might be expected to hesitate
before neutralizing its action -. now more than ever before in the history
of the world, are they doing all they can to further survival of the
unfittest! (Spencer 1994, 131)
By "the unfittest," he means "the undeserved poor" (Spencer
1994, 134). Here the normative connotation of "the fittest" and
"the unfittest" plays an important role in his rhetoric.
Secondly, reformationists used the notion of fitness to justify
their theory (this is sometimes called "Reform Darwinism." Clark
1984, 3). They agreed that survival of the fittest is desirable, but
they interpreted fitness as superiority in morality. For example, L.
T. Hobhouse claimed that "that the morally fittest shall actually
survive is the object of good social institutions" (Hobhouse 1893,
quoted in Jones 1980, 63).
Finally, the most influential type of Social Darwinism was
eugenics. Eugenics was founded by Francis Galton, a cousin of
Charles Darwin (Kevles 1985, 3·19). He observed that physically
and mentally inferior people were the most fertile, and concluded
that natural selection no longer operated in human society (Jones
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1980, 99~100). This conclusion shows that Galton associated
physical and intellectual superiority with fitness, and thought
such superior people should survive in natural selection. Galton's
solution was to encourage those who had the desirable qualities to
multiply faster than others (Jones 1980, 99). Some eugenicists
were aware that this "fitness" was not the same as "fitness" in
biology. Kevles summarizes this awareness as follows: H[i]fnatural
selection yielded the Darwinian fit, only artificial selection --by
governmental means, where appropriate -- could multiply the
eugenically fit" (Kevles 1985, 91). Later eugenics was used as an
ideological basis for Nazi's holocaust in Germany. Zmarzlik
describes the ideological components of it as follows:
[A] biologistic dogma of racial inequality; a moral nihilism invoking the
"struggle for existence" and the "survival of the fittest" as a universal
law of naturo; and -. resulting from both of these -- the conviction that
radical extermination of the racially inferior elements ancl the se)(~ction
of racially superior elements are justified by the fact that these policies
are a vital necessity to a people that wishes to be strong. (Zmarzlik 1972,
435)
Here fitness IS associated with racial superiority (whatever it
means).
Even though their political positions are conflicting with one
another, these three usages of "fitness" have strong similarities.
First, there is a curious inversion from biological usage in the
logical relationship between selection and fitness. As we saw in
section 3.1 of this paper, Spencer originally introduced the concept
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of fitness in terms of selection. But Social Darwinists introduce the
fitness independent from the environment, and then proceed to
say that the fittest ought to be selected regardless of the
environment (or, maybe, we should change the environment so
that the fittest can survive). Thus Social Darwinists' fitness is
logically independent from the environment and selection. This is
obvious in Reform Darwinism and eugenics, because their "moral
superiority" or "physical and intellectual superiority" refers to
human capacity that can be measured independently of the
environment. Of course Spencer was much more careful on this
point, but it seems to me that he also commited a similar inversion
when he called the poor the "unfittest" even though legislators
started to make laws to protect them. By this change of political
environment, the poor started to be selected for, so if we think of
fitness in terms of selection, they are no longer the unfittest.
Spencer's "fitness" in Social Darwinism starts to part from his
"fitness" in biology here. Another related similarity among these
usages is the role the word played in their normative claims. Jones
points out: "[t]he idea of 'fitness' tended to be imbued with
conventional notions of the desirable and valuable" (Jones 1980,
8). In the original biological usage, of course, "fitness" has no moral
evaluative meaning such as this.
It is easy to ignore these usages as abuses of the notion, but
we should consider why such abuses were possible. First, as I
suggested at the end of previous section, the change from "natural
selection" to the "survival of the fittest" seems to include more
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than a change of terminology, namely, it also involved a change in
the way of thinking. The change enabled us to think from the
organism's level. But this change also led Social Darwinists to a
kind of bias the sort discussed by Wimsatt (1980). An appropriate
bias in this case is what Wimsatt calls "descriptive localization"
(Wimsatt 1980, 232). Descriptive localization is to "[d]escribe a
relational property as if it were monadic, or a lower order
relational property; thus, e.g., fitness as a property of phenotypes
(or even of genes) rather than phenotype-environmental relation"
(Wimsatt 1980, 232). The bias applies to this case of social
Darwinism, as we saw above. This bias is less likely to happen if
we keep thinking in the "natural selection" way. Second, the choice
of the word "fit" is problematic. The word "fit" had a positive
normative meaning before the biological usage, and it was very
easy to confuse the biological claim that the fittest tends to survive
with the moral claim that the fittest should survive. Maybe
Spencer had chosen the word deliberately for this purpose.
4.2 Responses from biologists
Biologists struggled to dissociate biology from these forms of
Social Darwinism, especially from eugenics. Sometimes they even
tried to replace "fitness" with other words, such as "adaptive
value" (Paul 1994, 113). For example, Dobzhansky rarely used the
word "fitness" in his (1937), and used "adaptive value," "survival
value" and so on (Dobzhansky 1937. See pp. 153, 171, 178, 187 and
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so on).4 J. B. S. Haldane tried to distinguish biological "fitness"
and the "fitness" the eugenists talked about (Haldane 1938, 97-99).
He claimed that fitness "in the Darwinian sense" is assessed by
"average number of offspring left" (Haldane 1938, 78). (We will
discuss this measurement in the next section). If we understand
fitness in this sense, "we find that in many cases the eugenists are
demanding the sterilization of the fit" (Haldane 1938, 99). But he
does not intend to object to eugenics for biological reasons. "Man
should not follow nature blindly. He should, and does, interfere
with natural processes, including natural selection" (Haldane
1938, 99). In short, Haldane's points are two-fold: first, eugenists
use the word "fitness" inaccurately; second, biology is neutral
about normative judgments. I think that this is a common attitude
of biologists.
These responses from biologists show an interesting
interaction between social factors and a biological concept. What
motivated biologists to dissociate biology from Social Darwinism?
Maybe the answer is that Social Darwinism (especially eugenics)
was infamous when Dobzhansky and Haldane wrote their books
(1930s - 40s), and to be associated with it was disadvantageous for
biology. If this answer is correct, then the motivation was a kind of
conceptual inclusive fitness, not for a concept, but for biology itself.
4 More exactly, he used the adjective form "fit" several times (Dobzhansky 1987, 126,
187). This may come from a practical reason that "adaptive value" and so on have
no appropriate adjective form. In his later work, Dobzhansky used the word
"Darwinian fitness" as a synonymous phrase to "adaptive value" (Dobzhansky
H)55, 119, 122).
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5. Reproductive success and the tautology
problem
5.1 Population geneticists and "fitness"
Until 1930s, the concept of the fitness remained a vague
notion, without exact definition (this is a part of the reason Social
Darwinists could interpret the word freely). In the course of the
synthesis of Darwinism and Mendelism, the exact measurement of
"fitness" was attempted by population geneticists. According to
Kimbrough (1980), the first attempt of this kind was perhaps
made by R. A. Fisher (Kimbrough 1980, 159; Fisher 1930, 21-47).
Fisher's measurement goes as follows. First, he mathematically
defines a measurement m as the relative rate of increase (or
decrease) of a population (25-26). Next, he introduces the word
"fitness" in terms of m: "m measures the fitness to survive by the
objective fact of representation in future generations" (34). For
example, if two populations have different sets of genes and
accordingly have a different relative rate of increase, the
population which has the larger rate of increase has also greater
fitness. The concept of fitness is applied to a population of
individuals, not to an individual organism. The fitness of an
individual is the "expectation of offspring" (Fisher 1930, 25)
derived from the population's average number of offspring. We
should note that Fisher never defined "fitness" itself. As the above
quotation shows, he took the concept of fitness as intuitively
obvious.
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Haldane introduced the phrase "fitness in the Darwinian
sense" (Haldane 1932, 90; Haldane 1938, 78). His classical book,
The Cause of Evolution has a whole chapter named "What is
fitness?" (Haldane 1932, 111-143), but he did not try to either
define the word, nor give a exact measurement of it. 5 Instead, his
purpose in this chapter is to know "what is actually selected"
(Haldane 1932, 111). If these two questions are intended to be
identical, then Haldane's definition of fitness should be "what is
actually selected." His (1938) gives us a better understanding of
the phrase. When he introduces the term, he says, "fitness,
assessed in the Darwinian sense on the basis of the average
number of offspring left" (Haldane 1938, 78). Thus average
number of offspring is an assessment, not a definition. This book
has another passage that sounds like definition of fitness.
According to the passage, "fitness" is used "to refer to individuals
of such a constitution that they are likely to propagate themselves
in larger numbers than their fellows, either as a result of being
better adapted to their environment or more fertile, or both"
(Haldane 1938, 97). It is not clear if this is supposed to be a
definition, for this is found not in a theoretical book, but in political
writing. If we can take this as a definition, it is almost same as the
propensity interpretation of Mills and Beatty (1979).
Lastly, let us take a brief look at another leading population
geneticist, T. Dobzhansky. As I mentioned in the previous section,
5 He introduced Fisher's measurement in another place, but he did not associate it
with the "fitness in Darwinian sense" (See Haldane ] ~)32, 172).
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he did not use the word "fitness" in his (1937). But he introduced
the word "Darwinian fitness" in his later works. For example, in
his (1955), he says, "[t]he viability and the reproductive success
determine the contribution which the carrier of a genotype make
to the gene pool of the next generation of the species or ofa
population. This contribution is a measure of the adaptive value,
or Darwinian fitness, of the genotype" (Dobzhansky 1955, 119-
120, emphasis original). Except for the introduction of the notion
of the "gene pool," there is no essential difference between this
formulation and Fisher's. Again, the contribution of the viability
and the reproductive success to the gene pool is a measure, not a
definition, of Darwinian fitness; again, fitness is primarily about
genotype.
Thus, these founders of population genetics used the word
"fitness" in a very consistent way. This "Darwinian fitness"
measured by expectation of reproductive success became an
orthodox view of fitness. This status is easily understandable if we
consider the importance of population geneticists in the history of
Darwinism. Their works revived Darwinism from its eclipse by
synthesizing it with Mendelian genetics (Bowler 1989, 307-318). It
is natural that this measurement of "fitness" was accepted along
with the other parts of this works.
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5.2 The tautology problem and two interpretations of
fitness
This measurement by reproductive success became a
definition of "fitness." But it was not done in a very careful way.
For example, Waddington wrote in 1939 "the fitness of the
organism as measured by the number of offspring it leaves"
(Waddington 1939, 287), so the number of offspring was' not a
definition of fitness. But in 1957, he changed his mind. "[T]o speak
of an animal as 'fittest' does not necessarily imply that it is
strongest, or most healthy, or would win a beauty competition.
Essentially it denotes nothing more than leaving most offspring"
(Waddington 1957, 64-65). Here he almost defines the fitness by
the number of offspring. Moreover, we notice that in both
quotations he talked about not the expectation of reproduction, but
the actual number of offspring. Needless to say, this was not what
Fisher and Haldane intended. This definition by actual
reproduction caused theoretical problems later, namely a criticism
that natural selection is a worthless tautology (Dawkins 1982,
180). If we say "the fittest one is the one who left the most
offspring," then we know the fittest only by hindsight and there is
no possibility of falsification of the claim about fitness (Dawkins
1982, 184). Mills and Beatty suggest that the problem comes from
the definition by actual number of offspring (Mills and Beatty
266-269). If we interpret fitness as propensity of an organism to
leave offspring, the tautology disappears. They define fitness
primarily for an organism, and extend the definition to types
- 87-
(Mills and Beatty 272-282). The propensity interpretation has
another advantage, namely it is measured by expectation of
offspring, thus it is suitable to the usage of population geneticists.
The propensity interpretation removed a part of the problem.
But, as Beatty (1994) points out, we should be careful when we
reject that the "survival of the fittest" is tautologous because of
this propensity interpretation. Suppose we take "the fittest will
survive" as a central statement of Darwinism and define "fitness"
as "propensity to survive." If we restate the first statement by this
definition, we should say, "those who have the largest propensity
to survive will survive." This second statement, nevertheless, is
clearly false as a universal statement, because it is possible that
those who have larger propensity to survive unluckily do not
survive. Thus we should understand it as a probabilistic
statement, "the probability that those who have the largest
propensity to survive will survive is high." This last statement is
again tautologous because the propensity to survive and the
probability to survive means almost the same thing (for this
argument, we need more investigation of the notion of probability
itself. See, for example, Salmon 1967 for different philosophical
interpretations of probability).
Gould tried to avoid this conclusion by suggesting independent
criteria for fitness (Gould 1977, 39-45). In a given environment,
certain designs are superior to others a priori, "by an engineer's
criterion of good design" (Gould 1977, 42). But this solution just
postpones the tautology one step. What does "good design" mean?
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Running faster is not necessarily good if it requires sacrifice in
other aspects. The organism also needs to eat, to bear children. So
the best design should be somewhat balancing these requirements.
Where is the maximizing point? The answer to the question
amounts to the highest expectation of survival or reproduction. In
other words, a good design as a whole organism amounts to the
fitness in the sense of the propensity to survive. Thus,Gould's
attempt to avoid tautology is not very successful.
It seems to me that the tautology problem is totally
misguided. This problem comes from confusion between definition
and description. Remember how Spencer introduced fitness. He
defined the "survival of the fittest" as synonymous to "natural
selection." Thus, the statement "the fittest are those who survive
in natural selection" is true by definition. In other words, the
"survival of the fittest" is not a description of the fittest, but the
definition of the fittest. A definition is naturally tautologous and
there is no problem here. Does this mean Darwinism has no
empirical content? No. As Kimbrough (1980) and Beatty (1994)
point out, as far as natural selection itself can be stated without
mentioning "fitness," and has empirical content, the tautologous
status of the "survival of the fittest" causes no problem to
Darwinism. And, in fact, we can find such a statement of natural
selection in Sinnott (et al. 1958): "carriers of different genotypes
transmit their genes to the succeeding generations at different
rates" (247). This statement can be checked empirically, and we
can define the "survival of the fittest" and the "fitness" in terms of
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this difference in transmission rate. The tautology problem stems
from the misunderstanding of these relationships between central
concepts.
6. Inclusive fitness
6.1 Hamilton's "inclusive fitness"
D. Hamilton noticed that the orthodox measure of fitness by
reproduction is not enough because it admits "no possibility of the
evolution of any characters which are on average to the
disadvantage of the individuals possessing them" (Hamilton
1964a, 1), though we find "self-sacrifices" in nature. Hamilton's
idea is that if the relatives who receive the benefit have genes
"identical by decent," such sacrifices can evolve. To establish this
point, Hamilton formulates "neighbour modulated fitness" of an
organism in the first part of his paper (2-5). This is an organism's
reproductive success as "the sum of the basic unit 6 , the effect oa
of his personal genotype and the total eO of effects on him due to
his neighbours which will depend on their genotype" (3).
Neighbour modulated fitness is obtained by slightly modifying the
orthodox notion of fitness, but "rather unwieldy" because it
requires messy calculations (5). So Hamilton proposes another
way to see the same situation: "[e]very effect on reproduction
(; He means by "basic unit" the degree of fitness "which, if possessed by all the
individuals alike, would render the population both stationary and non-
evolutionary" (Hamilton 1964a, 2).
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which is due to A [an organism] can be thought of as made up of
two parts" (5). On the one hand, the genotype influences the
reproduction of the organism who has the genotype. On the other
hand, the genotype can influence the reproductive success of the
relatives of the organism. He introduce a measure R ° ij of a
genotype ij of a single locus (i and j stands for two alleles of the
locus). ROij is expressed as 1 + oROij, where 1 stands for the basic
unit (see footnote 6) and ORo ij stands for the total effect on genes i
and j in relatives of the organism which possesses the genotype
(including the effect on the organism itself) (5-6). Then he says, "Ro
ij will be called the inclusive fitness, oRo ij the inclusiv.e fitness
effecf' (6, emphases original). Thus this is the definition of
"inclusive fitness." He proved that inclusive fitness maximizes in
the course of selective change (7). Inclusive fitness is defined for a
genotype, but it is applicable to each individual (8). In his idealized
model, "we expect to find that no one is prepared to sacrifice his
life for any single person but that everyone will sacrifice it when he
can thereby save more than two brothers, or four half-brothers, or
eight first cousins..." (16). This new concept has remarkably
enhanced the explanatory power of Darwinism, especially in the
analysis of "altruistic" behaviors of social insects (Hamilton
1964b).
Hamilton's paper suggests interesting points about the
introduction of the concept of inclusive fitness. First, he actually
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introduced two notions of fitness, namely "neighbour modulated
fitness" and "inclusive fitness." The former is almost ignored (even
by Hamilton himself) and the latter has prevailed and became a
central notion of Darwinism. Where did the difference come from?
Dawkins points out these two notions have equivalent results
when properly used (Dawkins 1982, 187). So the empirical data
cannot discriminate between these two notions. The major
difference is usefulness in calculation (this seems to be the major
reason Hamilton preferred inclusive fitness). Inclusive fitness is
also easier to understand intuitively. For example, if we
reconstruct the idealized model in terms of the neighbour
modulated fitness, it will go as follows; "if I am drowning by
myself, I cannot expect someone to sacrifice his/her life to save me,
but if I am drowning with two other brothers, I can expect another
brother to come to save ... "7 This does not seem to be a good way to
explain the situation. If Hamilton's paper had been written in this
way, the influence of the paper, i. e., the conceptual inclusive
fitness of the paper (in Hull's sense --do not confuse this with
Hamilton's own usage of inclusive fitness), would have decreased.
Another interesting point is the conceptual problem Hamilton
struggled with. He was working on the behaviors of social insects,
and he found that some of these behaviors are hard to explain by
natural selection. This is an empirical anomaly for Darwinism,
7 Anotlwr way to put it; if the risk to lose one's own life to save me is 100%, no one
will help me; if the risk is less than 50%, then my brother will help me; if the risk
is less than 12.5%" my cousin will help me, and so on. This seems to be a more
- 92 -
and he got a solution by calculating the kinship relationship. But
why did he introduce a new concept to characterize the solution?
We cannot know the exact reason, but we can speculate.
Hamilton's result shows the fittest in the orthodox sense is not
necessarily selected by natural selection. On the other hand, the
notion of fitness is too convenient to give up. So, Hamilton had to
introduce a new concept which is as convenient as fitness, and has
a direct relation to natural selection. Needless to say, inclusive
fitness meets these requirements, and I think this is why
Hamilton introduced the word.
6.2 Dawkins's gene's eye view
Hamilton's "inclusive fitness" influenced many biologists.
Richard Dawkins is among them. Eventually Dawkins refuses to
use this word as a part of his theory, but it is obvious that his
"selfish gene" view is a response to the conceptual problem which
"inclusive fitness" caused (Dawkins 1989, 1982). According to
Dawkins, the unit of the natural selection is not an individual
organism, but a gene. He nicely explains biological phenomena
from the "gene's eye view" (Dawkins 1989, ix). From this point of
view, the orthodox notion of fitness of an individual organism is
erroneous (Dawkins 1989, 137). How about inclusive fitness?
According to him, inclusive fitness "was technically correct, but
complicated and easy to misunderstand" (Dawkins 1982, 194).
accurate explanation of the neighbour modulated fitness, but anyway this
explanation is not very attraetive
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He explains why "inclusive fitness" is misleading (Dawkins
1982, 190). Suppose I have two brothers, A and B. I want to
increase my inclusive fitness. I find brother A has more
similarities to me than B has. This seems to suggest that A has
more genes in common with me. Now, if I support A more than B,
does this action increase my inclusive fitness? From individual
organism's point of view, the answer seems to be yes. But if we
want to keep the neat connection between inclusive fitness and
selection, the answer should be no. The genes for facial
appearances and the genes for the action to support a brother are
independently assorted by Mendel's second law (if they are not on
the same chromosome).8 This gene for the behavior has the same
chance to be in A and in B, regardless of the facial appearance.
Thus, the gene to support A instead of B is not selected in natural
selection.
I would like to add another paradox which arises when we
uncritically talk about an organism's inclusive fitness (to my
knowledge, no one had pointed out this paradox before). In a
common sense account of inclusive fitness, when I save some
people at the cost of my own life, if the total amount of genes they
share with me is larger than the amount of genes I have, this
behavior increases my inclusive fitness. Now, 99% of human
genome are the same in every human being. Therefore, if two
8 Dawkins has a nice imaginative example (Dawkins 1989, 8~». If a gene for green
beardness and a gene to help someone who has a green beard are closely linked,
this link can be seleeted. But usually we cannot assume such a linkage, so the
argument lwre is still practically valid
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strangers are drowning, since they have at least 198% of my genes,
to save them at the cost of my life should increase my inclusive
fitness! Why does this kind of super altruistic genes not evolve?
The fallacy is, again, to forget the gene's eye view. For the gene for
such a behavior, the amount of shared genes between organisms is
irrelevant. When such a super altruistic gene is newly created by
mutation, it is among the remaining 1%, thus the probability that
a stranger has the same gene is almost O. Therefore, the super
altruistic behavior decreases inclusive fitness of the genotype
which includes the gene.
As these considerations suggest, if we restrict inclusive fitness
to a genotype ij as Hamilton originally defined, we can avoid these
mistakes. But once we start to talk about an organism's inclusive
fitness (and Hamilton himself admitted this usage), to commit a
fallacy is too easy. And here is the conceptual problem Dawkins
tried to solve. When we used the orthodox concept of fitness, we
could talk about the fitness of an individual organism and the
fitness of a genotype interchangeably. But once we start to think in
terms of inclusive fitness, inclusive fitness of a genotype ij is a
much clearer notion than that of individual organisms. The latter
caused miscalculation even by Hamilton himself (Dawkins 1982,
191-192; see also Hamilton 1964b, 30-31). So the problem Dawkins
struggled with was to reconstruct the whole theory in an
intuitively understandable way so that we can avoid mistakes. As
a solution to this problem, Dawkins adopted the gene's eye view,
and abandoned the notion of "fitness" itself.
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But here is another interesting fact. He occasionally talks
about "survival value" of replicators (Dawkins 1989, 199-200). As
we saw before, this is One of the words population geneticists
introduced in place of the "fitness." In Dawkins's usage, "survival
value" roughly means "advantages at the gene level" (Dawkins
1989, 200). This is almost the notion of "fitness" except that it is a
property of genes, not organisms or genotypes. Therefore, he
abolishes the word "fitness" at the individual organismal (and
genotypic) level, but he still exploits the convenience of the notion
at the gene level.
7. Conclusions
This historical overview suggests many interesting
relationships between concept changes and theoretical and social
factors. The notion of fitness went through various changes in its
meaning (see the tables below). What were the causes of these
changes?
First, there are many cases in which Hull's account can be
applied. Spencer's word choice of "fitness" increased his conceptual
inclusive fitness because not only biologists but also social
Darwinists used the word. Wallace and Darwin had also a good
reason to adopt the word. They thought this word would help in
accurate communication of the theory. Later, population
geneticists still used the word, but they tried to give it an exact
meaning, and sometimes they tried to stop using it. Perhaps this
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move was motivated by the consideration that the association with
Social Darwinism decreases the conceptual inclusive fitness of
biology. Hamilton's introduction of the inclusive fitness gives us
another example of inclusive conceptual fitness. He had an enough
reason to choose inclusive fitness instead of neighbour modulated
fitness, but at the same time this choice seems to increase his
conceptual inclusive fitness.
Secondly, these cases and many other cases are also examples
of conceptual problems and their solutions. For Wallace and
Darwin, the adequacy of the notion of "natural selection" was the
problem. They tried to reduce the use of a metaphorical expression
by introducing the "survival of the fittest." The problem for
population geneticists was to clarify the notion. The propensity
interpretation of the fitness was addressed to solve a conceptual
problem, i. e., the tautology problem. Hamilton's problem was to
solve the anomaly about social behavior without losing the
convenient notion of fitness. Dawkins tried to answer the problem
that the notion of inclusive fitness caused -- namely the misleading
characteristics of the inclusive fitness of an individual organism.
His answer was to stop thinking at organismal level, and stop
using the notion of fitness itself.
When we analyze the history of conceptual change, both of
these two kinds of factors are indispensable to explain the
changes. Social factors are not enough to explain the answer the
scientists chose. Internal factors are not enough to explain why a
particular solution was chosen instead of other possible answers.
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The history of the concept of "fitness" seems to exemplify this
claim9 .
9 lowe a lot to Prof. Darden and discussions in her seminar. Prof. Darden also gave
me many helpful eomments on earlier versions of this paper.
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4. factors that act on it
5. importance of the notion in the theory
6. other comments











not important in his theory








"survival of the fittest" = natural selection
individual organism
?
inheritable variations and environment
central word for his version of Darwinism




C. "Fitness" in social Darwinism
1. definition ?
2. of what? individual human being
3. measurement economic success or moral superiority or physical and intellectual
superiority
inheritance, relation to other human beings
normative connotation of "fitness" justified their political claims
measurable independent from environment








genotype (secondarily applicable to individual organism)
average reproductive success
environmfmt
one of theoretical notions





E. The tautological definition of "fitness"
1. definition actual success in survival and reproduction
2. of what? individual organism
3. measurement success in survival and reproduction
4. factors genotype, environment and luck
5. importance supposed to be a central notion of the theory
6. comments a careless definition
F. The propensity interpretation of "fitness"
1. definition propensity to success in survival and reproduction
2. of what? individual organism (secondarily applicable to type)
3. measurement equivalent to D
4. factors genotype and environment
5. importance central to avoid tautology
6. comments reasonable solution to the tautology problem
G. Engineer's view definition of fitness by Gould
1. definition better design is fitter
2. of what? individual organism (part of an organism?)
3. measurement engineer's criteria
4. factors genotype and environment.
5. importance central to avoid tautology
6. comments
H. "Inclusive fitness" by Hamilton
1. definition expectation of an organism's survival and reproductive success
+expectation of its effect t.o relatives' survival and reproduct.ive
success
genotype of the organism (also applicable t.o individual organism
+particular genes)
3. measurement same as 1.
4. factors social behavior associated with the genotype, genetic structure of
relatives, etc.
core notion of his analysis of social behavior
enhanced explanatory power of Darwinism









expectation of the organism's survival and reproduction when we
take account of the effect from neighbours.
genotype of the individual, genotype of neighbours and
environment
almost ignored by author himself
empirically equivalent to inclusive fitness
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success in leaving copies
behavior of other genes in the same population
used occasionally
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